Charlie Stream Team Summaries

Pepperdine University - Pepperdine University

Recognizing NATO’s mission to guarantee freedom and security, our team advocates for implementing the TTT Plan - Technology, Transition, Trust. 

In order to promote transparency and accountability, NATO should prioritize collaboration with civil society organizations like AlgoTransparency, creating technological safeguards against disinformation that provide sustainable and cost-efficient solutions over the next several decades, as these safeguards can be re-implemented for various scenarios such as the Ukraine election.

As cyber-life becomes more intertwined with human reality, the successful connection between technological reforms and credible, trustworthy relationships becomes increasingly important. Through partnerships with independent, multicultural individuals and experts, NATO can cost-effectively create a coalition of fact-checking parties to actively fight against disinformation. 

Lastly, our plan seeks to foster trust within the realm of cybersecurity by curating informational resources and making them readily available to local communities within national globally to bolster public safety campaigns that are adjustable to various audiences.

Disinformation Destroyers - William & Mary

Lack of communication among NATO member states on disinformation contributes to insecurity and instability of global democracies. Our bottom up approach (CFIL) with a Khan Academy Sponsored Education Program addresses public awareness and misinformation prevention. Additionally our top down approach (AVIS) addresses readiness through a communicative alerting channel. A conglomeration of NATO Member States, private social media companies, and NATO sponsored detection and alert teams will collaborate to identify and report misinformation that is being released and facilitate reciprocal information flow. Detection and alert systems will be based on preexisting technologies. We understand that disinformation is an ever-present and ever-growing concern, so we believe both a long term and more immediate solution is necessary. Lastly, the joint CFIL and AVIS solution is scalable beyond NATO in the future.

KCL-HUMINT - King's College London

​​Building on the democratic deficit following Russian disinformation campaigns in Ukraine, we propose a multidimensional strategy focused on 3Cs – Cementing resilience – widening awareness in the long run towards disinformation campaigns, Common vision – protecting democratic values to prevent disinformation from fragmenting NATO unity and Cooperation – between stakeholders to guard against information operations. This strategy enhances NATO efforts, utilising educational tools targeted at societies and the military, technology to filter coercive content and bolstering diversity in NATO’s strategic communications department to include underrepresented voices to Cement resilience. To build a Common vision, we suggest bolstering NATO influence in countries least supportive of NATO to firstly safeguard NATO values. For Cooperation, this touches upon establishing code of conducts between NATO and private sectors and for users, cyber-norms within NATO, for academic linkages to be deepened and to enhance visibility of present efforts like the NATO Innovation Hub to include greater whole-of-society cooperation.

cyberops - Cambridge University; University of St Andrews; William & Mary

The contours of the information landscape are evolving faster than ever. 

But while information is everywhere, “truth” and ways to verify it is in short supply. This whole-of-society issue is one which requires an equally holistic set of solutions. The novel solutions proposed here not only make use of an existing social media infrastructure to pit like against like, but instigates anticipatory, ground-level participation from those traditionally at the margins. 

In a sensitive ecosystem which can be engineered for nefarious purposes, we look to operationalizing actors across the spectrum and mobilizing both digital and civil tools in a new direction.

Our proposal goes with the grain, towards principles of behavioral economics to build in greater critical thinking via intrinsically motivated behaviors. A global issue requires a global solution rather than a solely US interventionist slant in regards to implementation and execution. 

Blue Team - Kenyon College

Barrier nations such as the Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are subject to outside interference through social media. NATO can counteract these plots, but it needs to cultivate trust and establish legitimacy within these countries. Our three-pronged approach entails creating a new agency dedicated to open source collaboration, of which one tool it will provide is a 2SV measure in order to track IPs of bad actors and make bot accounts less feasible. On the ground, the civil team will work, live and recruit from the local community in an anticipatory effort to promote trust between the general populace and NATO, and to preserve social cohesion and stability, all while allowing them access to  NATO resources After identification, the third prong, INTERPOL, will be relied upon to subdue bad actors, return resources to local governments, and disrupt echo-chamber algorithms with neutral information administered in cooperation with local governments and NATO.

Vacilando - Middle East Technical University

A proactive approach to solving the disinformation problem will be more effective in combating disinformation, for which we have created a three-fold project.

First, NATO will cooperate with social media companies Meta, Twitter, and Google to supplement algorithms which filter out disinformation. Considering the fact that these companies already have similar projects underway, this is meant to further develop and integrate these systems. Moreover, this will create a foundation for the second part. 

The second stage is the creation of a ranking mechanism for social media users with the objective of incentivizing them to proactively identify and report disinformation. Not only will this educate the masses but it will also aid in developing the machine-learning of the algorithm mentioned in the first part.

Finally, NATO will create an interactive game with the aim of not only illustrating the potential ramifications of uncontrolled disinformation but also educating the players.

Pandas - GMU - George Mason University

Because that the threat of disinformation is constantly evolving, the Disinformation Defense Initiative (DDI) aims to promote digital literacy in NATO countries. Additionally, DDI aims to neutralize the rise and spread of disinformation in NATO countries by pursuing a vision to create and sustain a new generation of highly qualified individuals alongside the development of comprehensive computer disinformation detection algorithms. 

Implementation of this framework and development of necessary infrastructure is imperative to the security of NATO member countries. Collaboration on this front is of paramount importance for all NATO members, which is why the DDI will serve as a central method for NATO countries to communicate with one another on the issue of disinformation. Recognizing that disinformation peaks during election cycles, our framework is to be implemented continuously post-elections to sustain the literacy environment that it will generate as well as help to diminish the evolving capabilities of disinformation centers.

j2k - University of St Andrews and College of William and Mary (JDP)

NATO is currently facing disinformation threats from actors both external and internal. NATO should humorously expose bad actors on social media. This will help NATO connect with younger audiences and demonstrate how to identify disinformation. NATO should engage in pre-planning and pre-engaging with local communities at acute risk for disinformation operations. NATO should work with local, trusted figures to highlight the presence of disinformation. NATO should clarify Article 5’s stance on cyberattacks and disinformation, to empower NATO to respond. Also, NATO should use existing institutions to change policies regarding internal management to allow for countermeasures directed at NATO member disinformation against fellow members. This solution includes difficult, but necessary structural reforms, as well as engagement with populations most at risk. Without these changes, NATO will remain susceptible to disinformation and threats in cyberspace.