Break-Out Group #2: "Cyber Security and New Technologies/Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs)"
Break-Out Group #2: “Cyber Security and New Technologies / Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs)” featured:
- Dr Raluca Csernatoni, Fellow, Carnegie Europe [Moderator]
- Dr Amy Ertan, Cyber and Hybrid Policy Section (CHP), Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESC), NATO
- Dr Lucas Kello, Associate Professor of International Relations, Oxford University
- Ms Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Innovation Officer, Innovation Unit, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO
- Dr Bruno Volckaert, Professor, IDLab, Ghent University
Watch the Report Out from the Break-Out Groups
The aim of this session was to reflect on how emerging and disruptive technologies or EDTs have become a ‘battlefield’ for values, economic statecraft, political influence, and (cyber) security and defense concerns. In this respect, the speakers addressed three broad questions:
- How can we define dual-use EDTs and in what ways are their applications impacting (cyber) security and defence? For instance, how are AI systems and quantum-enabled technologies disrupting (cyber) security and defence?
- Given that a lot of innovation originates in the commercial sector, how should the inclusion of private actors be mainstreamed into (cyber) security and defense markets and supply chains?
- What are the ethical, “human-machine” teaming, and oversight considerations of deploying complex EDTs in (cyber) security and defense, especially regarding their effective and responsible governance?
Indeed, the speakers agreed that emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) present both risks and opportunities. Greater reliance on EDTs will likely involve growing uncertainty and complexity from the “boardroom” to the “battlefield.” In this respect, the panel explored the difficulties that stem from the contested definition of EDTs, their dual-use nature, and ethical considerations. Their uncertain roles as force enablers in future security and defense applications may impact cybersecurity and cyber defense in multiple ways. Accordingly, EDTs do not exist in a vacuum - they are neighbors. International organizations such as NATO and Allies need to understand the full spectrum of implications: from definitional and legal considerations, the fusion of EDTs such as Artificial Intelligence, quantum-enabled systems, data, critical infrastructures, and cybersecurity, to a better situational awareness of their disruptive impact on national security. The panel also noted that because EDTs are still evolving and in their early days of development, various actors need to improve their understanding of which technologies to prioritize and which would be useful for offense and defense operations. Part of this can be harnessing technologies in the right ways, to include strategic competition. Better cooperation between NATO and the EU was emphasized, by finding the right synergies across dual-use research, innovation and development programmes, such as NATO’s DIANA and Innovation Fund and the EU’s Horizon Europe and European Defence Fund. In particular, the discussion highlighted how an unclear and contested conceptual understanding of dual-use EDTs may lead to inconsistent approaches to human oversight, strategic planning, situational awareness, foresight, and procurement. Part of this may involve societal questions about the role of government and the amount of trust required. Civil-military synergies and human-machine teaming were two of the main issues flagged by the panel participants. Given that a lot of innovation originates in the commercial sector, specifically in start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the inclusion of these actors into the cybersecurity and defense markets and supply chains will be important going forward. Importantly, the panel engaged with the notion of the “sovereignty gap,” stressing the fact that governments are increasingly relying on the products and expertise of the private sector, thus outsourcing critical services to the corporate sector with regard to critical infrastructure protections, cybersecurity, and the broader deployment of digital technologies. The dependence is as simple as voting machines and the sanctity of election voting, as well. There is an absence of coherent strategy at national level for designating which technological domain is strategic, where further investments or foreign investment screening are needed. Related to this, the example of China’s 5G capabilities was mentioned. Conversely, technological giants are increasingly starting to play a geopolitical role on the global stage, by providing critical services and products, as the war in Ukraine has shown. NATO needs to look at how to foster better adoption of technology and how to protect the advantage of the technology transfer market, among other innovations. Norms will play an important role here too. NATO member nations need a reevaluation of ethical and transparency principles, to also ensure that other civilian stakeholder, such as universities and private sector partners can work on security and defence emerging technologies.
An open question, addressed by Break-Out Group #2 and the Opening Panel, was whether the offense or the defence has the advantage in cyber operations.
