Scattered for Safety

Boko Haram, Girls, and the Promise of Distance Learning

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On February 19th, 2018, Boko Haram kidnapped 110 girls from their school in Dapchi, Nigeria, underscoring the weakness of strategies that secure students through a hardening of targets. Instead, a policy that disperses girls using technology-enabled educational forums would make it more difficult for Boko Haram to abduct large groups of women. Such distance learning programs will also implement low-cost, sustainable education reform in Nigeria's insecure zones. The opportunity for this educational model to be accessible to students at any time and location will effectively protect girls at risk in Nigeria as well as students in other conflict zones around the world.

Introduction

This year marks over a decade since the emergence of Boko Haram as an Islamic fundamentalist group intent on overthrowing the Nigerian government.[1] The insurgency's stance against democracy and Western-style education has translated into thousands of attacks on villages, schools, and military posts.[2]

Boko Haram initially recruited women with promises of a better life. However, the 2014 abduction of 276 school-aged girls in Chibok marked a shift in the insurgency's tactics from recruitment to kidnapping as a means of bolstering female ranks. Boko Haram's leaders use these attacks to cultivate fear among civilians and rely on kidnapped women as wives, suicide bombers, and slaves.[3] Boko Haram focuses primarily on rural community schools because of their remote location and the weak presence of security forces.[4] The large number of students congregated in a single location provides opportunities for militants to take significant numbers of women at once.

The rise in attacks on female Nigerians, combined with Boko Haram's targeting of schools, poses a serious threat to girls' education in the Lake Chad Basin. The international community and the Nigerian government recognize the threat; however, actions taken thus far are hindered by the weak government and precarious military situation in the country.

Developing an alternative education program using low-cost data cards will ensure that Nigerian girls can safely learn. Rather than gathering in a specific location at a particular time, students can study from home using cell phones or tablets. Technology-enabled education will not only protect girls from attack, but also increase educational resources to students living in rural areas.

Boko Haram's Bid for Control of the Northeast

If we overlook women's position in the roots and operations of Boko Haram, we miss an opportunity to understand the international dynamics of the insurgency and to cultivate more effective counterinsurgency strategies.

— Hilary Matfess, 2017[5]

In 2015, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari reinvigorated efforts to eradicate Boko Haram. Soldiers from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger pushed the insurgency out of much of the territory it controlled in the northeast, including the caliphate's capital of Gwoza.[6] In December of 2015, the Buhari administration declared the insurgent group "technically defeated."[7]

With the assumption that Boko Haram had been essentially eliminated, Western awareness of the insurgency has diminished.[8] However, the Nigerian military's hold on Gwoza remains tenuous and Boko Haram retains a strong foothold in the surrounding Mandara Mountains and in frontier zones along Nigeria's borders.[9] Although the insurgents have lost significant territory, they maintain an effective operational capacity and attacks across the northeast persist.[10]

Attacks on Education: Preventing Girls from Attending School

Attacks on government-run schools allow Boko Haram to demonstrate its opposition to Western-style, non-Islamic education and the Nigerian government.[11] As such, the insurgency has regularly targeted schools throughout the Lake Chad Basin—burning buildings, killing teachers, and abducting students in an effort to eliminate Western teaching and erode government infrastructure.[12] Since 2009, over 1,800 schools have been damaged or closed as a result of the conflict and approximately 670,000 children have been kept out of the classroom.[13]

The 2014 Chibok abductions remain the most potent example of Boko Haram's impact on Nigeria's fragile education system.[14] While important in garnering international attention for the plight of the Nigerian people, the focus on the Chibok girls has overshadowed Boko Haram's wider patterns of female abuse.[15] Between the start of 2014 and the spring of 2015 the group kidnapped over 2,000 women, including hundreds of school-aged girls.[16] The Chibok girls constitute only 14 percent of abducted females in a 15-month period.

Women kidnapped from schools or villages face two alternatives.[17] They can convert to Islam and become the wife of a male combatant. If they refuse conversion, they are subject to abuse, forced labor, or use in suicide bombings. Women who refuse to comply with militants face the threat of death.[18]

Factors Contributing to Boko Haram's Attacks

Boko Haram's targeting of villages and schools stems from the politicization of religion in Nigeria, corruption in the security sector, social norms and inflationary bride prices, and the increased use of female suicide bombers.

- *Politicized religiosity.* The beginning of Nigeria's Fourth Republic in 1999 heightened longstanding religious tensions between Christians and Muslims and within factions of Islam.[19] With the emergence of democracy, civilians and religious leaders in the Muslim-majority North began advocating for a broadening of Sharia law. At the same time, politicians seeking civil support played into these demands and promised religious legislation in exchange for electoral backing. In ensuing years, civilians claimed that administrations, at both the federal and state level, failed to fulfill the promises made while campaigning. The failure of elected officials to meet the demands of multiple religious and ethnic factions increased disillusionment with the government that Boko Haram used to garner support in its early years. Militants continue to identify the government as Westernized and corrupt because the administration has not enacted the fundamentalist policies desired by the group.

- *Corruption of the Nigerian state.* Mistrust of the Nigerian security sector is widespread.[20] Research suggests that fewer than one in three Nigerians trust the police.[21] The military is well-known for committing abuses against civilians, whether by burning villages or mistreating those living in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and detention centers.[22] The government frames its own efforts to eradicate Boko Haram, as well as the military's counter-insurgency campaign, as heroic.[23] Yet it has not fully acknowledged the extensive civilian abuse that has occurred on its watch, namely in government-run camps for those displaced by the conflict. From 2009 to 2015, over 7,000 people died in these camps, 1,200 were executed by security forces, and 20,000 were arrested under fraudulent charges.[24] Numerous reports indicate that among citizens in the northeast, the majority fear the military more than Boko Haram.[25]

  Government financial corruption further impedes effective management of the crisis. Systems of patronage dictate relationships among politicians and between government officials and civilian populations.[26] Because Nigerians identify foremost with their family, religion, and ethnic group, political activity is shaped by the expectation that elected officials will steer benefits back to their respective group. Civilians vote for candidates within their religious or ethnic faction and expect jobs, wealth, and infrastructure in return. These patronage-based demands from the population pressure politicians to abuse their positions, leading to significant government corruption.

- *The confluence of inflationary bride prices and social norms.* Men face pressure to find a wife in the Lake Chad Basin as only married males are considered socially significant. Inflationary bride prices in Nigeria help fuel Boko Haram; growing numbers of young Nigerian men join Boko Haram because of the insurgency's promise of a bride.[27] As bride prices rise, more Nigerian men will be unable to afford the expense of marriage. Boko Haram will remain a compelling option for disaffected men, as the promise of gaining a bride in exchange for service appeals to recruits seeking higher social status.[28]

- *Increased use of female suicide bombers.* In recent years, as the insurgency has focused on rural areas, it has increasingly relied on women and children to carry out acts of terrorism.[29] Women and children often raise little suspicion in village environments, allowing Boko Haram to pose a significant but inconspicuous threat.[30] Evidence suggests

that from 2014 to 2016, approximately 75 percent of all suicide bombers were female.[31] No other insurgency in history has relied on female bombers to carry out attacks to this extent.[32]

Structural challenges posed by the Nigerian government, military, and culture will continue to frustrate attempts to eradicate Boko Haram. Corruption of government elites and disappointment in the failure of democracy to change the lives of ordinary Nigerians are key factors in the widespread mistrust of the federal system.[33] The expense of marriage, as well as the role of female terrorism in Boko Haram's operations continues to motivate abductions.

Humanitarian Implications of Boko Haram's Attacks

Beyond the challenge to law and order, Boko Haram's operations in the Lake Chad Basin pose two humanitarian problems for the region—the reintegration of abducted women into society and widespread civilian displacement.

- *Unsuccessful reintegration of abducted girls.* Young women abducted by Boko Haram who escape or are rescued face intense discrimination upon their return to normal society.[34] Families and community members often refuse to accept women previously associated with Boko Haram because there is widespread belief that these girls have been indoctrinated with fundamentalist ideology and will negatively affect their communities.[35] In many instances, the struggles women formerly affiliated with Boko Haram faced after rescue led them to return to the insurgency.[36]

  The Chibok girls provide one example of the challenges of female reintegration. Many of the rescued girls are currently attending a private Nigerian university with extreme security restrictions. These women are not allowed to leave campus, live with any children they may have, or see their families.[37] The government touts the return of the girls and their entry into the university as a success, yet has not addressed the problems associated with their isolation from the outside world.

- *Widespread displacement.* The humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin is one of the worst in the world. Data from 2017 reveals that "more than 2.8 million people have been displaced, and more than 4.4 million people face severe food insecurity and are at risk of starvation and malnutrition as a result of the insurgency."[38] The United Nations (UN) estimates that over 14 million people in the Lake Chad Basin have been impacted by the conflict.[39] Effective humanitarian intervention is impossible throughout most of the northeast.[40] Schoolchildren are particularly affected by the dire humanitarian situation as opportunities for education are limited in host communities and displaced persons camps.

Existing Approaches to Protect At-Risk Students

A number of UN offices, think tanks, and international NGOs have proposed various methods for combating Boko Haram and protecting students. To date, the implementation of these proposals has had limited success in preventing attacks on schools. Programs to secure education in Nigeria fall into two categories: actions that can be taken solely by the Nigerian government, and actions that involve international organizations.

Current and Proposed Policies for the Nigerian Government

A multitude of non-state actors have proposed ways for the Nigerian government to address Boko Haram's attacks on schools, including increasing security forces in schools, adjusting traditional approaches to education, reinforcing the Safe Schools Initiative, and modifying the government's communication efforts with both civilians and insurgents. However, these efforts are expensive and time consuming and are frustrated by Nigeria's weak government and insecure military situation.

- *Increase security presence in schools.* The most common proposal to protect students from Boko Haram's raids is to increase the presence of security forces in northeastern schools.[41] However, increased military presence since 2015 has done little to halt attacks.[42] Although Boko Haram no longer dominates densely populated urban areas as in previous years, it remains a threat to rural communities near the Mandara Mountains and along Nigeria's borders.[43]

    The 2018 Dapchi abductions of 110 girls highlights the inability of military and police forces to prevent attacks on schools. One month prior to the raid, the Nigerian government withdrew troops from the town, leaving it unguarded. On the day of the abduction, local security forces failed to take preventive action after receiving warning calls hours before the attack.[44]

    Proposals to reinforce school security depend on increases in the number of troops deployed to the northeast. However, Nigeria's military and police forces are simply not large enough to adequately protect schools in this region.[45] Additionally, statistics of current troop distribution highlight that 40 percent of security forces guard politicians and officials.[46] This statistic suggests that the government is unwilling to relocate its security forces to address the crisis fully. Such recommendations also ignore the widespread mistrust of the military across the country and the violent abuses committed by military forces against Nigerian women and children in villages and displacement camps.[47]

- *Adjust traditional approaches to education.* The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Education controls schooling throughout the country, leaving states and local regions with limited autonomy to make educational policy decisions.[48] Altering the current government structure to decentralize the education system is not probable, as such an undertaking would be expensive and time-consuming.

A related recommendation is to encourage the proliferation of private religious schools. This suggestion requires shifting cultural norms across the northeast and a significant amount of money from private stakeholders committed to building schools. The majority of children in religious private schools across Nigeria come from wealthy households.[49] Encouraging communities to send their children to private schools is unrealistic if families in these areas do not have the money for education.[50]

- *Reinforce the Safe Schools Initiative.* Following the Chibok abductions, the Nigerian government, in partnership with the UN, the Global Business Coalition for Education, and various international donors, established the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI). The initiative outlines a variety of policies aimed at protecting students from insurgent attacks, the majority of which are security-oriented.[51] Effective implementation of the SSI faces significant obstacles, considering the limited strength of the Nigerian government and the cost of the program.

  SSI has made some progress in their student transfer program, which relocates students in high-risk zones to safer locations. While the program has successfully moved over 2,000 students, over 5,000 primary and secondary schools in the northeast remain unprotected.[52] The vast amount of money dedicated to this program combined with limited results raises concerns over how funds are being spent.[53]

- *Improve diplomacy and community relations.* International NGOs and think tanks argue that the Nigerian government must negotiate with Boko Haram for the release of captured women in the aftermath of abductions.[54] The Chibok abductions are cited as evidence for this recommendation as negotiations led to the return of many girls in October 2016 and May 2017.[55] Nigerian officials highlight their return as proof of successful diplomacy, reinforcing the heroic narrative surrounding government and military responses to the insurgency. However, the true cost of "rescuing" the girls is often overlooked: the government released five captured insurgents and provided two million euros in exchange for 82 girls.[56] The cost of recovering the hostages illustrates the strength of Boko Haram to extract concessions from the Nigerian government. Future negotiations would only highlight the weakness of the government and would incentivize further attacks against women.

  A related recommendation is the need for better communication between the Nigerian government and the public. Nigerians often view the government's handling of the Boko Haram crisis, particularly the Chibok abductions, as evidence of political complicity.[57] In the immediate aftermath of Chibok, the Nigerian government denied the attack and displayed indifference to the plight of the girls and their families.[58] Although the administration eventually admitted the abduction had occurred, deception and mismanagement continued to characterize the governmental response in the following months and years.[59] Poor information management after Chibok led various external groups to stress the importance of investigating all attacks, publishing the findings, and working to ensure all missing persons are brought home. International organizations advocated similar actions following the Dapchi abduction, underscoring that the government response to kidnappings did not change significantly in the intervening years.[60]

However, this strategy deals with the aftermath of attacks rather than working to protect students in the future. Increasing communication between the government and insurgents and improving community relations ignores the underlying problem: abductions of girls attending school.

All four of these proposals face significant obstacles. Widespread civilian distrust of the government and Boko Haram's continued presence give the government little authority in this region. Many Nigerians believe that Boko Haram continues to have ties to the upper echelons of the government, reinforcing a lack of faith in political actors to eradicate the insurgency.[61] Moreover, Nigeria's precarious financial situation emphasizes the need for inexpensive responses to the crisis.[62] The limited success of the Safe School Initiative has already raised concerns over how the government spends international aid, and the Dapchi abductions illustrate its inability to protect Nigerian girls.

Current and Proposed Policies That Involve International Organizations

Efforts that could be undertaken by or in partnership with international organizations include: increasing collaboration between key stakeholders, effectively implementing policies outlined in the Safe Schools Declaration, and reinforcing the Prevention of Violent Extremism Through Education guidelines. Mistrust of the Nigerian security sector and a lack of accountability measures hinder these efforts.

- *Increase collaboration between key stakeholders.* Better coordination between the UN, the Nigerian government and military, international NGOs and civil society organizations could better protect citizens, compared to current efforts undertaken solely by the Nigerian government. The Global Coalition to Prevent Education from Attack, an inter-agency coalition, calls on international organizations and civil society groups to support efforts by the Nigerian government to promote safe and peaceful educational environments.[63] Urging the UN to better incorporate civil society into counterterrorism efforts is a related recommendation.[64]

  Abuses by the Nigerian security sector are the main factor impeding successful cooperation between Nigeria and international organizations. Military forces regularly prevent aid organizations from delivering relief to displaced peoples and attack humanitarian personnel in IDP camps.[65] Interviews with anonymous UN and NGO staff working in the northeast point to the military's illegal and inappropriate abuses of power, including the seizure of food and goods intended for refugees.[66] Although Nigeria has created government agencies to specifically manage IDP camps, in reality, the security sector plays the principal role. The Nigerian government and military's previous pattern of behavior and systematic abuse of power prevent policies that rely on collaboration with the international community from being realized.

- *Implement the Safe Schools Declaration.* In 2015, the Oslo Conference on Safe Schools created the Safe Schools Declaration, a voluntary commitment that outlines methods of protecting education during armed conflict.[67] Between 2013 and 2017, attacks on

educational settings occurred in 28 countries, illustrating the importance of finding solutions that can be applied to various locations at risk.[68] Nigeria, along with 81 other countries, have endorsed the Declaration in the past three years. The signatories pledge to collaborate with one another to implement its policies.[69] While the guidelines for preventing attacks on education are impressive, there is no system of accountability to ensure these policies are realized. Thus far, the signing of the Declaration has been a largely symbolic gesture—recent attacks on schools illustrate that progress has been limited.

- *Reinforce Prevention of Violent Extremism Through Education (PVE-E).* Since 2015, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has advocated the Prevention of Violent Extremism Through Education, a policy which trains teachers and policy makers to encourage peace and create resilience to extremism.[70] In 2017, UNESCO began working actively in the Sahel to strengthen commitment to non-violence at the student level.[71] In response to calls to develop national action plans, the Nigerian government launched its own PVE program using UNESCO's template in November 2017.[72] However, tangible results from this effort have not yet surfaced.

The Nigerian military's pattern of behavior in handling the conflict prevents better coordination between the Nigerian security sector and the international community. The dire humanitarian situation in IDP camps demonstrates the struggle between the government and humanitarian aid workers. Additionally, voluntary commitments like the Safe Schools Declaration and PVE-E are difficult to realize fully without accountability measures, particularly in Nigeria where corruption already pervades the political system.

The Nigerian government will remain the primary counterinsurgency force in the fight against Boko Haram for the foreseeable future. An extensive history of corruption, bad governance, and abuses by the security sector in Nigeria highlight the significant obstacles facing current initiatives and proposals. The Dapchi abduction in February 2018 illustrates that any procedures implemented after Chibok have been unable to protect girls seeking an education in the northeast.

Educating Nigerian Girls Through Distance Learning

Implementing a policy of dispersal in which girls do not gather in a central location for school will increase the difficulty of kidnapping girls. Insurgents will be less motivated to attack schools and girls will be able to seek an education without the persistent threat of abduction. This policy is based on distance learning programs in which students and teachers are separated. In northeastern Nigeria, distance learning through technology should be implemented as the principal form of schooling for girls in secondary settings. Students can access educational materials on SD cards inserted into basic phones or tablets. Such technology-based forums will allow students to learn effectively wherever they are and at any time.

Examples of Distance Education

Existing alternative education initiatives, like the Open University, War Child Holland, the Commonwealth of Learning, and Jesuit Worldwide Learning, provide templates for improving educational access for students in rural Nigeria. These programs highlight the success of distance learning in areas where access to education is limited.

- *Open University.* Open University runs a global network of distance learning programs, including projects for women in Malawi, Sierra Leone, and India. For example, in partnership with the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Open University's programs in Malawi and Sierra Leone allow participants to finish their secondary education at home so that they can train to become primary school teachers.[73] In India, Open University is pursuing a similar program to train teachers using low-cost data cards preloaded with educational materials that can be inserted into inexpensive cell phones and tablets.[74] Data cards allow students to access information even when access to Wi-Fi is nonexistent.

- *War Child Holland's "Can't Wait to Learn."* Launched in 2015, this program to replace traditional education is now operating in Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, and Uganda, and has reached over 100,000 students.[75] Children are provided with tablets through which they can play interactive learning games and watch videos. Local educators support the students with technical problems and ensure that tablets are used properly.[76] In some instances, students without access to reliable electricity have been provided with solar panels to charge their devices.

- *The Commonwealth of Learning (COL).* COL offers open education and distance learning resources to students in various countries including Botswana, India, Australia, Namibia, and Papua New Guinea.[77] COL's emphasis on the flexibility of open schooling allows countries to tailor educational programs to their specific needs. Through a partnership with the National Open University of Nigeria, COL has provided hundreds of thousands of tertiary students in Nigeria with the opportunity to simultaneously study online and work; however, these opportunities are limited to students in Southern Nigeria.[78] Students in the northeast that are unable to complete secondary school due to violence do not have the credits and exam scores needed to enroll in such higher-education programs.[79]

- *Jesuit Worldwide Learning (JWL).* Jesuit Worldwide Learning partners with universities and mission organizations to offer tertiary education to students from marginalized groups.[80] JWL uses a combination of on-site learning centers and virtual classrooms to educate students. The program has reached more than 5,000 students since 2010, including those in host communities in Kenya, Malawi, and Jordan.[81]

These programs demonstrate that distance learning is a viable alternative to conventional education approaches. Open University's program in India shows that a technological solution using data cards is effective and does not require internet accessibility. War Child Holland's "Can't Wait to Learn" program establishes that distance learning is effective with younger students as a replacement for full-time classroom learning and that such policies are possible in war-torn

societies. COL's work in Nigeria's tertiary education system indicates that the country is open to distance learning initiatives. Jesuit Worldwide Learning has successfully reached students living in host communities through virtual learning; such programs have the potential to be instituted in places with similar displacement situations.

Implementation of a Distance Learning Program in the Northeast

Establishing a successful distance learning initiative in northeastern Nigeria requires multiple components. Foremost, a steering committee must be organized to oversee the program. Current educational materials must then be transformed into digital format, devices must be acquired and distributed, and students must be provided with the ability to charge their devices. Finally, support networks must be created to ensure that girls are able to undertake individual learning properly in informal settings.

- *Organizing a steering committee.* A steering committee comprised of teachers, donors, and individuals from NGOs is the best method of creating a distance learning initiative in the northeast. A Nigerian NGO with an established presence in the region could spearhead the distance learning program. Potential organizations include local NGOs, such as: the Assisting, Caring and Empowering Africans Foundation (ACE Charity), which is focused on education of students at all levels in the northeastern states; the African Youth Development Foundation, which directs attention to rural Nigerian youth; or the Neem Foundation, which works to support, reintegrate, and educate young women impacted by the insurgency. Intergovernmental organizations could also aid in policy implementation. One such potential iNGO is Commonwealth of Learning: Nigeria, which focuses on the education of Nigerian women at the tertiary level and combines e-learning and conventional education approaches.[82]

  Funding from an external aid organization could help expand distance learning to a wide swath of girls in the northeast. Organizations like USAID, or the Gates Foundation have supported educational initiatives in the past and may be interested in working with a program to empower young women in Nigeria.

- *Preventing government backlash.* The government stands to benefit from this type of technological solution as it is a cheaper alternative to providing military protection at schools. However, the government may still view such an initiative as an indication of its failure to protect Nigerian students. Therefore, political support for a distance learning program is crucial for success. Selecting a local NGO already at work in the region ensures that distance learning will be supported rather than looked upon with suspicion. Established trust between the Nigerian government and an NGO is a crucial component of implementing an alternative educational model.

- *Transforming educational materials.* This program would adapt Nigeria's current education curriculum rather than propose a new curriculum or role for the Nigerian government. Participating actors would collaborate to convert the existing educational curriculum into a digital format to be placed onto SD cards. Writing educational materials

from scratch is an expensive and lengthy process. Instead, translating existing school resources into a digital format to be placed on an SD card will not only reduce time and cost, but will also further ensure government support.

- *Acquiring devices.* Although phone penetration across the country is high, young women may not have access to personal devices or may use flip phones that lack the appropriate screen size to clearly view educational materials. In these cases, phones or tablets can be distributed along with SD cards. Devices must have a screen large enough for girls to view materials and a long-lasting battery. Internet connectivity is not necessary for this type of program. International cell phone companies may be willing to support this program and provide a set of basic devices for girls pursuing distance learning.

- *Ensuring access to electricity.* An internationally funded solar energy project is the best option for providing students the ability to charge phones or tablets. While a durable device that holds a charge is an important aspect of technology-based educational programs, the ability to charge devices is equally crucial. Sixty percent of Nigerians lack reliable access to electricity. This figure is even higher in rural areas.[83] The country relies primarily on gas for power; however, lack of nationwide energy infrastructure and conflicts in the south continually disrupt critical gas pipelines.[84] The most prominent attacks in 2016 reduced Nigerian oil production to the lowest levels in 25 years. Although the Nigerian government is working to expand access to electricity, it is a time consuming and expensive undertaking.[85] Due to these energy constraints, a solar-based charging system would be ideal for students in the northeast.

  One potential partner is Power Africa, a program run by USAID. In recent years, Power Africa partnered with the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to fund Nova-Lumos (Lumos), an organization that provides off-grid solar energy in parts of rural Nigeria. The technology provided by Lumos includes a home solar panel that is roughly the size of a small suitcase. It is linked to an indoor energy storage unit and can be used to power lights, fans, cellphone chargers and other small appliances.[86]

- *Establishing support networks.* Contact between students and educators is a necessary component of a successful distance learning program. Even a skilled learner would likely experience difficulty if forced to study alone without any external support. In the case of northeastern Nigeria, teachers could visit individual students in their village weekly or speak with students over the phone. Through this type of network, current teachers would be able to remain in their positions and assist students. Encouragement, guidance, and the ability to ask questions are crucial aspects of all forms of education.

  In addition to personal visits from teachers, past programs illustrate that audiovisual components of distance learning could also be beneficial.[87] Access to visual or audio clips on a daily or weekly basis that brief students on the upcoming lessons would guide girls. Videos would be simple and short and thus not take up excessive space on SD cards.

Effective collaboration among various actors to implement all necessary aspects of a distance learning program would provide girls in northeastern Nigeria with a safe and sustainable method of education.

Broadening the Scope: Additional Applications of Distance Learning

The situation in Nigeria is not entirely unique. Attacks on women and schools are not a new phenomenon for insurgencies in Africa.[88] The emergence of fragile conflict zones often means that secure access to schooling cannot be maintained.[89] Aside from terrorism, education remains hindered by socio-economic factors, both within Nigeria and in other regions across the world.

Providing Access to Schooling in Conflict Zones

Distance learning programs would provide access to education for displaced children living in IDP camps and host communities across Nigeria. Schooling in these locations is minimal, if existent at all.[90] When free educational opportunities are available, families often cannot afford to lose the income their children bring to the household.[91] If children could access education digitally within these settlements at a time which suits the needs of their families, they could gain skills otherwise inaccessible. Other countries experiencing large-scale humanitarian crises and those impacted by terrorism are also prime candidates for distance learning programs. Because such programs are broad and flexible, they can be modified for implementation in areas where education is under attack.

Challenging Socio-Economic Impediments to Education

Widespread poverty in northeastern Nigeria is an additional factor preventing children from attending school. Many families depend on the income children bring in when working on a daily basis. Distance learning would allow children from poor households to continue working or complete necessary tasks at home while also pursuing an education. Such a policy can be implemented in regions across the world where similar socio-economic factors prevent students from seeking schooling opportunities.

Conclusion

Between 2009 and 2017 Boko Haram carried out 91 attacks on schools in northeastern Nigeria, resulting in 679 fatalities, 212 injuries, and countless abductions.[92] The insurgency remains a lethal threat in the Lake Chad Basin. Although the government has repeatedly claimed to have made gains in eradicating the terrorist group, militants continue to attack villages and schools. The overall situation in northeastern Nigeria remains fragile and is unlikely to improve significantly in the short term.[93] As long as this group continues to disrupt northeastern Nigeria, girls in the region

are at risk. The Nigerian government's widespread abuses and civilian distrust of the military makes it difficult to enact security-based responses.

A technological approach will allow Nigerian girls to access an education through cell phones or tablets at any time and location. This initiative is a relatively inexpensive method of protecting students without requiring government funding. The targeting of girls gathering in school buildings is eliminated through distance learning, allowing thousands of Nigerian school-aged girls to safely access an education.

[1] Boko Haram was founded in the early 2000s by Mohammed Yusuf. The group remained fairly marginal until 2009, when they began to conduct terrorist attacks in the northeast. The subsequent military crackdown captured or killed hundreds of members including Yusuf, who died in police custody. Alex Thurston, "'The disease is unbelief': Boko Haram's religious and political worldview" *The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World*, no. 22 (2016) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis-Paper_Alex-Thurston_Final_Web.pdf
The group returned in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau and began to target government and security forces in urban areas. In 2013, Boko Haram shifted their focus to large-scale attacks on unprotected rural areas. Boko Haram began frequent assaults on government schools as a way to protest the state. John Campbell and Matthew T. Page, *Nigeria: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018).

[2] Boko Haram's ideology centers around two tenets: religious exclusivism and victimhood. Adherents demand that Muslims oppose all anti-Islamic practices, notably democracy, Western education, and alliances with non-Muslim groups. Boko Haram justifies its actions by claiming to be responding to years of persecution against Muslims in the north. Alex Thurston, "'The disease is unbelief': Boko Haram's religious and political worldview" *The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World*, no. 22 (2016) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis-Paper_Alex-Thurston_Final_Web.pdf.
The insurgency enacts multiple types of terrorist acts on Nigerian communities in their bid for control of the northeast–notably bombings, village raids, kidnappings, and arson. Claire Felter, "Nigeria's Battle With Boko Haram," *Council on Foreign Relations,* August 8, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-battle-boko-haram

[3] Hilary Matfess, "Three Years Later, A Look at the #BringBackOurGirls Catch-22," *The Daily Beast*, April 14 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/three-years-later-a-look-at-the-bringbackourgirls-catch-22; John Campbell and Asch Harwood, "Boko Haram's Deadly Impact," *Council on Foreign Relations,* August 20, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/article/boko-harams-deadly-impact.

[4] In mid-2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a year-long state of emergency in the Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states after a series of violent Boko Haram attacks. Crackdown on Boko Haram's operations in urban areas pushed the insurgency out of cities and into rural communities. Attacks on village schools increased significantly in the aftermath of Jonathan's declaration. Jennifer G. Cooke et al "Militancy and the Arc of Instability: Violent Extremism in the Sahel," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, September 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160922_Sanderson_MilitancyArcInstabilitySahel_Web.pdf; Will Ross, "Nigeria's president Jonathan declares state of emergency," *BBC*, May 15, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-22535419/nigeria-s-president-jonathan-declares-state-of-emergency

[5] Hilary Matfess, *Women and the War on Boko Haram* (London, Zed Books, 2017), 7.

[6] The previous administration, led by President Goodluck Jonathan, saw the continued rise of Boko Haram as a threat to Nigeria. Citizens elected Mohammed Buhari, a previous military dictator, in 2015 after the Chibok abductions and the ensuing protests across the globe. Throughout his campaign, Buhari emphasized that tackling Boko Haram would be his priority if elected.

[7] This characterization has proved false in the ensuing years as attacks on villages and schools have continued. Max Siollun "Can Boko Haram Be Defeated?," *The New York Times*, May 18, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/opinion/can-boko-haram-be-defeated.html.
After declaring Boko Haram "technically defeated," the Buhari administration focused less military effort on the north overall, even as conflicts in the Niger Delta between Fulani herdsmen and agricultural communities also spiked. Instead, the government began to focus on southern Nigeria, where local opposition groups were attacking the country's crucial source of revenue – crude oil production. Cook et al "Arc of Instability".

[8] Scott MacEachern, *Searching for Boko Haram: A History of Violence in Central Africa* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018), 155.

[9] *Ibid*

[10] Boko Haram's early operational capacity stems from connections with other terrorist groups, specifically Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In 2010, leader Abubakar Shekau sent a group of Boko Haram insurgents to meet with AQIM leadership. These talks resulted in funding, weapons, and training from AQIM. Jacob Zenn argues that there is potential for AQIM to emerge in Nigeria in the future due to their growing strength in neighboring regions. In 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and was retitled as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). In August 2016, the insurgency split into two factions: a restored Boko Haram led by Shekau, and a faction under the leadership of Abu Musad al-Barnawi, the son of Muhammad Yusuf, which remained under the title ISWAP and continued collaboration with the Islamic State. This division within Boko

Haram stems from disagreements over when to conduct jihad. While internal factionalization of Boko Haram in 2016 is cited as another justification for Boko Haram's decline, some scholars disagree, arguing that the threat is now diversified rather than reduced.

Jacob Zenn, ed., "Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency," *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,* May 2018, https://ctc.usma.edu/boko-haram-beyond-headlines-analyses-africas-enduring-insurgency/

[11] The insurgency's rejection of Western-style schooling is a part of a broader critique of the Nigerian government. Boko Haram blames the country's government corruption on Western domination during the colonization period. Insurgents attack Nigeria's political elites who received western educations and have failed to bring promised prosperity to Muslims in the north. Shekau, following his predecessor, believes that western education is leading to the destruction of Islam. *Ibid*. Also see Campbell and Page, *Nigeria.* International Crisis Group, "Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency," (December 5, 2016), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf.

[12] There are three types of schools in Nigeria: government schools, private religious schools, and private non-religious schools. 93% of children in the country attend government schools, putting them at greater risk of attack. National Population Commission, "Basic Education Profile for Northeast Nigeria," Education Policy and Data Center, https://www.epdc.org/sites/default/files/documents/nigeria_subnatn_ne_0.pdf

[13] UNICEF, "Beyond Chibok" (April 2016), https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Beyond_Chibok.pdf

[14] Of the 276 girls abducted in 2014, 57 escaped within hours of kidnapping and another 4 escaped after the first few hours. 103 were released in 2016 and 2017 following negotiations between the government and insurgents. As of April 2018, 112 of the Chibok girls were still unaccounted for. International Crisis Group, "Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria," (April 12, 2018), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b137-preventing-boko-haram-abductions_0.pdf

[15] Mia Bloom and Hilary Matfess, "Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram's Terror," *PRISM* 6, no. 1 (2016): 105-121 https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=790993

[16] Amnesty International "Nigeria: Abducted women and girls forced to join Boko Haram attacks," (April 14, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/04/nigeria-abducted-women-and-girls-forced-to-join-boko-haram-attacks/

[17] The situation for women in Nigeria is more complex than attacks initially indicate, for envisioning women solely as passive victims of the insurgency strips them of their agency. Although statistics demonstrate that Boko Haram currently relies primarily on kidnapped females, it is important to note that women also willingly join the insurgency. Female participation often stems from a desire to improve quality of life. Although the sect appears repressive by Western standards, women are granted far greater freedoms than are typical for females in northern Nigeria. Recent evidence suggests, however, that leaders have altered the method of incorporating females into the sect and focus increasingly on abduction. Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 101-109; Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani "The Women Rescued from Boko Haram who are Returning to their Captors," *The New Yorker* (December 20, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-women-rescued-from-boko-haram-who-are-returning-to-their-captors?utm_source=facebook&utm_social-type=owned&utm_brand=tny&mbid=social_facebook&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR3sammynutLiIHeVBKn_8d75j4q8Udq1BviPwzCR_aDmlNxdBuGOcRkh6c&fbclid=IwAR3r3D3Q3f1CTA5b_dsSuXr4YXOGsaplncB2Wlfg43TaFm7xmlAQ2fc9jcc.

[18] Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 88.

[19] In 1999, Nigeria entered its Fourth Republic and civilian democratic rule replaced the military dictatorships that had ruled the country for the previous 33 years. A decentralization of federal power gave new fire to long-standing debates over the role of religion in society. In the Muslim north, states adopted Sharia law. However, continued poor government performance and failure to provide for ordinary Nigerians created conditions ripe for reformist groups. Boko Haram criticizes the Sufi orders and Islamic ideology that permeates governance in northeastern Nigeria. They see their own form of Salafi-jihadi Islam as the solution to the problems in the Northeast. Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 37-44.

[20] The security sector in Nigeria includes not only the military and police force, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). Organized in 2013, the group comprises young Nigerian men disillusioned with the inability of the state to curb violence. Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Pieri argue that while the CJTF has proven effective in capturing Boko Haram militants and defending rural totalities, its activity has led to an increase in Boko Haram's violence against civilians. Attacks against those the insurgency believes are collaborating with or working for the CJTF have risen since 2013. There is both military and civilian mistrust of the CJTF for alleged collaboration with Boko Haram. In the context of this paper, the term military does not include the CJTF. Zenn, "Beyond the Headlines".

[21] Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 84.

[22] According to Amnesty International, Nigerian military forces arrested at least 20,000 people from 2009 to 2015, the majority of which were arbitrary. Amnesty International, "Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands," (2015), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF. The military regularly rounds up entire villages in the northeast accusing locals of collaborating with Boko Haram. People detained by the military are reportedly subject to acts of torture including beatings, shootings, nail and teeth extractions, rape and sexual violence. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, "The Limits of Punishment," (May 2018), https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/post/2761/LoPWeb070119.pdf. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently conducting an examination of the Nigerian military for their human rights abuses, with the Office of the Prosecutor rumored to be bringing two cases against members of the Nigerian Security Forces. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, "Nigeria", http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/nigeria.
For more detailed accounts of abuses by Nigerian security forces, see Amnesty International, "Nigeria: Starving women raped by soldiers and militia who claim to be rescuing them," (May 24, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/nigeria-starving-women-raped-by-soldiers-and-militia-who-claim-to-be-rescuing-them/; John Campbell, "Nigerian Military Conduct Should Be of Serious International Concern," *Council on Foreign Relations* (December 19, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerian-military-conduct-should-be-serious-international-concern; Dionne Searcey and Emmanuel Akinwotu "Nigeria Says Soldiers Who Killed Marchers Were Provoked. Video Shows Otherwise," *The New York Times* (December 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/world/africa/nigeria-military-abuses.html; Dionne Searcey, "'They Told Us They Were Here to Help Us.' Then Came Slaughter." *The New York Times* (February 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/world/africa/nigeria-civilian-massacre.html?module=inline; Dionne Searcey, "Nigerian Jet Mistakenly Bombs Refugee Camp, Killing Scores" *The New York Times* (January 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/world/africa/nigerian-jet-mistakenly-bombs-refugee-camp-killing-dozens.html?module=inline.

[23] Reality contradicts this "hero" narrative. The first Chibok girl to leave Boko Haram, Amina Ali Nkeki, left voluntarily in May 2016 without the support of the military, though the government portrayed it as a rescue. Nkeki showed clear continued ties to the sect, later stating that she missed her Boko Haram husband. Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 106.

[24] Adam Nossiter, "Abuses by Nigeria's Military Found to be Rampant in War Against Boko Haram," *The New York Times* (June 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/world/africa/abuses-nigeria-military-boko-haram-war-report.html; Amnesty International "Stars on Their Shoulders".

[25] MacEachern, *Searching for Boko Haram,* 156.

[26] Although Nigeria is democratic, it is also considered a kleptocracy, a system where government and public officials seek personal gain at the expense of citizens. Nigerians typically identify with their family, religion, and ethnic group much more so than with the state. Political activity is thus shaped by religion and ethnicity; civilians expect politicians from their identifying group to steer wealth, jobs, and infrastructure projects towards their region. These systems of patronage fuel corruption as politicians are pressured to abuse their positions in order to fulfill these promises. Campbell and Page, *Nigeria,* 2, 12-13, 37.

[27] International Crisis Group, "Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency".

[28] Hilary Matfess, "In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage between Brideprice and Violent Conflict," *International Security* 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 7-40, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00289.

[29] The insurgency dispatched its first female suicide bomber in June 2014 to attack military barracks in Gombe State. 469 female suicide bombers have been deployed or arrested by Boko Haram as of February 28, 2018. In 240 incidents, over 1,200 people have been killed in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Zenn, "Beyond the Headlines"; R.S., "Why Boko Haram uses female suicide-bombers," *The Economist* (October 23, 2017), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/10/23/why-boko-haram-uses-female-suicide-bombers.

[30] Female suicide terrorism has five key advantages according to Elizabeth Pearson. The shock value of female suicide bombers can ensure publicity and propaganda. Women and girls are less often suspected to be attackers and therefore have easier access to targets. Using women as suicide bombers does not disrupt the male leadership line within a terrorist group. Women can be used when there is a shortage of male recruits. Finally, the use of women in suicide terrorism can be used to shame men into fighting. Zenn, "Beyond the Headlines". Other reports also argue the decision to use women instead of men for such attacks stems from a view of women as less significant. Women are viewed as a more indispensable, particularly in cases when the male fighting force is weakened or dwindling. Cook et al "Arc of Instability".

[31] UNICEF, "Beyond Chibok"

[32] Joshua Meservey, "Boko Haram's Sick Ploy to Turn Girls Into Suicide Bombers," *The Heritage Foundation* (June 20, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/terrorism/commentary/boko-harams-sick-ploy-turn-girls-suicide-bombers.

[33] International Crisis Group, "Boko Haram on the Back Foot?," (May 4, 2016), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/boko-haram-on-the-back-foot.pdf.

[34] The reintegration of women associated with Boko Haram is a critical weakness in the current Nigerian environment. There is currently only one known program for deradicalizing females associated with the insurgency. The Bulunkutu Transit Centre in Maiduguri, Borno provides deradicalization and rehabilitation support for low-risk women and children who were detained by the Nigerian military. Women can remain in the center for up to 12 weeks and receive counseling, educational services, and vocational training. However, evidence suggests that women who are released form the Bulunkutu center still face severe ostracism upon returning to their communities. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research "Limits of Punishment". Also see UNICEF, "Beyond Chibok"; International Crisis Group "Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency"; Aryn Baker, "Boko Haram's Other Victims," *TIME* (June 27, 2017), http://time.com/boko-harams-other-victims/.

[35] UNICEF, "Bad Blood" (February 2016), https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/media/1331/file; United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, "Limits of Punishment".

[36] Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani "Returning to their Captors".

[37] Additionally, language barriers prevent the girls from adequately accessing care and education. The women at the university are instructed to speak only English. While a handful of the women speak English well, most of them struggle with the language and are at a kindergarten level of phonics. The women's psychologist, teachers, and director all speak to them in English, bringing into question the depth and effectiveness of their therapy and schooling. Dionne Searcey, "Kidnapped as Schoolgirls by Boko Haram: Here They are Now," *The New York Times* (April 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/11/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-girls.html. Some girls received the opportunity to study in schools across the United States, but they were largely upheld as symbols and fundraising opportunities for the universities. Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 78.

[38] UN News, "Security Council wraps up Lake Chad Basin visit; stops in 'epicentre' of Boko Haram violence," (March 6, 2017), https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/03/552742-security-council-wraps-lake-chad-basin-visit-stops-epicentre-boko-haram.

[39] *Ibid*

[40] Humanitarian aid is difficult because of lack of consistent presence of NGOs, lack of resources, and because of the government's unwillingness to funnel money into the region. Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 148, 177, 180.

[41] For examples see United Nations OCHA, "The Sahel crisis deepens – Education under attack in Burkina Faso," *Medium* (July 11, 2018), https://medium.com/humanitarian-dispatches/the-sahel-crisis-deepens-education-under-attack-in-burkina-faso-4383d7b7c7be; International Crisis Group, "Preventing Abductions".

[42] Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,*27.

[43] Furthermore, Boko Haram's frontier position has allowed it to act across international borders and destabilize communities in neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. The conflict has also negatively impacted the education systems of these countries. *Ibid.* UNICEF, "Beyond Chibok".

[44] Boko Haram militants reportedly invaded the school grounds in Toyota Hilux pickups and Tata trucks and began shooting. They were able to kidnap 110 of the 906 students present at the school, ranging from ages 11 to 19, and return to their camp over 200km away unhindered. The militants who returned the girls in March reportedly told parents: "Do not send your daughters back to school; otherwise we will come back for them." International Crisis Group, "Preventing Abductions". Also see Amnesty International, "Security forces failed"; Stephanie Busari and David McKenzie, "Into danger's arms: Chaos as schoolgirls flee Boko Haram," *CNN* (March 5, 2018), https://www-m.cnn.com/2018/03/01/africa/dapchi-nigeria-boko-haram-intl/index.html.

[45] Defense Headquarters spokesperson Brigadier General John Agim explained that the military lacks sufficient troops to guard all of the schools in the northeast. Deployment of an additional 2,000 security guards to schools in the three northeastern states would only cover 300 out of 5000 public primary and secondary schools. Federal police are also undermanned because over 150,000 of an official total of 371,000 personnel are assigned as bodyguards for senior officials, politicians, and other VIPs in state capitals across the country. International Crisis Group, "Preventing Abductions".

[46] *Ibid*

[47] See endnote 22.

[48] Farah Mobarak, "The Inconsistency of Nigeria's Education System and Its Implication for Curriculum Implementation," *Journal of US-China Public Administration* 12, no. 3 (March 2015):167-180, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323750042_The_Inconsistency_of_Nigeria's_Education_System_and_Its_Implication_for_Curriculum_Implementation; Emily Gustafsson-Wright and Katie Smith, "Abducted Schoolgirls in

Nigeria: Improving Education and Preventing Future Boko Haram Attacks," *Brookings Institution* (April 17, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/2014/04/17/abducted-schoolgirls-in-nigeria-improving-education-and-preventing-future-boko-haram-attacks/.

[49] National Population Commission, "Basic Education Profile".

[50] Already a limited number of families can afford to send their children to school. Increasing the cost of doing so would only further harm the country's education statistics. Emily Gustafsson-Wright and Katie Smith, "Preventing Attacks".

[51] United Nations Development Group, "Nigeria Safe Schools Initiative Multi-Donor Trust Fund," http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/NGA00; International Crisis Group, "Preventing Abductions".

[52] International Crisis Group, "Preventing Abductions".

[53] Chika Oduah, "Nigerians Ask How Millions for Safe Schools Program Are Being Spent," *VOA News* (May 28, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/a/nigeria-schools-being-rebuilt/4412714.html.

[54] International Crisis Group, "Preventing Abductions".

[55] The Nigerian government remains fairly secretive about the nature of the negotiations. The release of 21 girls in October 2016 was the result of discussions mediated by the International Red Cross and Swiss Government, however, these groups never revealed what Boko Haram received in return for this group of girls. Matfess, "#BringBackOurGirls Catch-22"; Philip Obaji Jr., "The Boko Haram Hostages Nobody Talks About," *The Daily Beast* (December 25, 2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-boko-haram-girl-hostages-nobody-talks-about.

[56] Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw, "Freedom for the World's Most Famous Hostages Came at a Heavy Price," *The Wall Street Journal* (December 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/two-bags-of-cash-for-boko-haram-the-untold-story-of-how-nigeria-freed-its-kidnapped-girls-1513957354.

[57] The Nigerian government reportedly had more than four hours notice than an attack was going to take place on the Chibok school but failed to deploy security forces or secure the area. Amnesty International, "Nigeria: Security forces failed to act on warnings about Boko Haram attack hours before abduction of schoolgirls," (March 20, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/nigeria-abduction-of-schoolgirls-security-forces-failed-to-act-boko-haram/. It took President Goodluck Jonathan weeks to address the public and publish the names of the kidnapped girls. Dionne Searcey, "Kidnapped as Schoolgirls by Boko Haram: Here They are Now," *The New York Times* (April 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/11/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-girls.html

[58] #BringBackOurGirls became the rallying cry of the activist movement that erupted after the abductions, and included figures like Michelle Obama, Pope Francis, and Malala Yousafazi. A former member of Boko Haram explains that the insurgency realized that the girls could be a source of leverage and fear as the movement spread and captured the attention of famous figures. Matfess, "#BrinkBackOurGirls Catch-22".

[59] President Goodluck Jonathan waited over two weeks to speak publicly about the attacks. BBC News, "Nigeria schoolgirl abductions: Protest leader detained," (May 5, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27283278#. In October 2014, the Jonathan government claimed that they had concluded negotiations with Boko Haram for the release of the girls, however, the negotiations turned out to be a scam by people who were pretending to represent Boko Haram in order to get money from the government through negotiations. Nnamdi Obasi and Ayo Obe, "The Chibok Girls Must Be Found – and Freed," *International Crisis Group* (April 13, 2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/chibok-girls-must-be-found-and-freed. Jonathan failed to visit the Chibok school after the attacks, further contributing to the narrative of government abandonment that permeates the north. Emily Dugan, "Nigeria schoolgirls kidnap: Anger as President Goodluck Jonathan snubs grieving families," *The Independent* (May 16, 2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nigeria-schoolgirls-kidnap-anger-as-president-goodluck-jonathan-snubs-grieving-families-9387914.html. The lack of government response led to protests outside of the president's house six months after the attack. Tim Cocks, "Six months after girls abducted, Nigerians protest near president's house," *Reuters* (October 14, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-girls/six-months-after-girls-abducted-nigerians-protest-near-presidents-house-idUSKCN0I32FX20141014. In one instance, the president's wife reportedly ordered the detainment of a protester. "BBC News, Protest leader detained".

[60] The government initially remained silent in the 48 hours following the Dapchi abduction. The Yobe State Government denied that any students had been abducted and attempted to deter parents of the abducted girls from speaking out. On February 21, the Yobe State Government proclaimed that Nigerian troops had rescued the girls, then retracted their statement 24 hours later. President Buhari acknowledged the attacks on February 23, admitting the attacks were a "national disaster" and dispatching two federal government missions to Dapchi three weeks after the abductions. International Crisis Group, "Preventing Abductions"; Global Coalition to Protect Education from

Attack, "Education Under Attack 2018",
http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/eua_2018_full.pdf. The

[61] Boko Haram's growth is often tied to the sponsorship of Ali Mode Sheriff, governor of the Borno State from 2003 to 2011, who supported the expansion of Sharia law to garner political favor. Sheriff implemented aspects of Sharia in exchange for Yusuf delivering votes. There have also been reports of Boko Haram commanders being arrested in governor's lodges and of other insurgent relationships with politicians. MacEachern, *Searching for Boko Haram,* 177; Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 17; Zenn, "Beyond the Headlines". Seun Opejobi, "PDP leadership crises: Sheriff created Boko Haram – Makarfi," *The Daily Post* (June 24, 2016), http://dailypost.ng/2016/06/24/pdp-leadership-crises-sheriff-created-boko-haram-makarfi/. For more information, see The Premium Times, "How Kabiru Sokoto was arrested," (February 10, 2012), https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/3731-how-kabiru-sokoto-was-arrested.html; Emma Ujah, "High-profile Boko Haram member arrested in Ali Modu Sheriff's house – Zanna," *Vanguard* (October 21, 2012), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/10/high-profile-boko-haram-member-arrested-in-ali-modu-sheriffs-house-zanna/; Abdulkadir Badsha Mukthar, "'Boko Haram commander' is my nephew – Senator Ahmed Zanna" *Daily Trust* (October 21, 2012), https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/boko-haram-commander-is-my-nephew-senator-ahmed-zanna.html. https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/boko-haram-commander-is-my-nephew-senator-ahmed-zanna.html

[62] See Johnbosco Agbakwuru, "Buhari meets with governors, says Nigeria's economy is in bad shape," *Vanguard* (December 15, 2018), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/12/buhari-meets-with-governors-says-nigerias-economy-in-bad-shape/; Jideofor Adibe, "What to expect from the 2019 presidential election in Nigeria," *Brookings Institution* (January 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/01/22/what-to-expect-from-the-2019-presidential-election-in-nigeria/.

[63] Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, "Education Under Attack 2018".

[64] Eric Rosand, "Where is civil society in the U.N.'s counterterrorism efforts?" *Brookings Institution* (May 15, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/15/where-is-civil-society-in-the-u-n-s-counterterrorism-efforts/.

[65] Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 167-170.

[66] Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 145-190.

[67] The Declaration outlines specific actions to be taken by signatories, including collecting reliable data on attacks on educational facilities, investigating allegations of applicable national and international law, developing 'conflict-sensitive' approaches to education, and seeking to ensure continuation of education during armed conflict. Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, "Safe Schools Declaration," http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/safe_schools_declaration-final.pdf.

[68] Zama Neff, "Girls Kidnapped by Boko Haram Share Their Stories at the UN," *Human Rights Watch* (October 16, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/16/girls-kidnapped-boko-haram-share-their-stories-un

[69] The most recent conference on Safe Schools took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina in March 2017.

[70] UNESCO, "Preventing violent extremism: the power of education", https://en.unesco.org/interculturaldialogue/blog/520.

[71] UNESCO Office in Dakar, "Education to prevent violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel," (May 24, 2017), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/dakar/about-this-office/single-view/news/education_to_prevent_violent_extremism_in_west_africa_and_th/.

[72] The framework focuses on four key areas: (i) strengthening Nigerian institutions to PVE; (ii) strengthening the rule of law and human rights; (iii) building community engagement and resilience; and (iv) integrating strategic communication to PVE. Counter Extremism Project, "Nigeria: Extremism & Counter-Extremism," https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/NG-10092018.pdf.

[73] Jack O'Sullivan, "A new approach to Africa's education crisis," *Bold* (December 14, 2016), https://bold.expert/a-new-approach-to-africas-education-crisis/; The Open University, "Malawi Access Into Teaching Scholarships (MATS)," http://www.open.ac.uk/about/international-development/projects-and-programmes/mats-malawi-access-teaching-scholarships#; The Open University, "GATE – Girls' Access to Education," http://www.open.ac.uk/about/international-development/projects-and-programmes/gate-girls-access-education.

[74] Data cards can be inserted into inexpensive tablets and mobile phones. Jack O'Sullivan "A new approach to Africa's education crisis".

[75] "Can't Wait to Learn," War Child Holland, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.warchildholland.org/projects/cant-wait-to-learn/; War Child UK and War Child Holland, "Innovative Approaches to Education in Emergencies," https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/war_child_cant_wait_to_learn.pdf.

[76] War Child Holland, "Can't Wait to Learn". "Can't Wait to Learn" is supported by various organizations including the Cisco Foundation, ECHO, Google, Humanitarian Education Accelerator, the IKEA Foundation, the Dutch Postcode Lottery, UNCHR, UNICEF, and USAID.

[77] "About the Commonwealth of Learning," Commonwealth of Learning, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.col.org/about/what-commonwealth-learning.

[78] "Nigeria," Commonwealth of Learning, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.col.org/member-countries/nigeria.

[79] "Admission Requirements," National Open University of Nigeria, accessed March 20, 2019, http://nouedu.net/page/admission-requirements-0.

[80] "Learning Together to Transform the World," Jesuit Worldwide Learning, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.jwl.org/en/home.

[81] "Become a Student," Jesuit Worldwide Learning, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.jwl.org/en/become-a-student.

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[87] Open University has used audiovisual equipment as a complement to traditional distance learning materials. Video components used in Open University's program in India show teachers explaining new materials to students. For more information on this program see: TESS-India, "About TESS-India," http://www.tess-india.edu.in/about-tess-india.

[88] Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,* 93. As a historical illustration, clear parallels exist between Boko Haram and the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, which also relied on kidnapping young women, as well as between Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, which has targeted universities. On October 10, 1996, the LRA abducted 139 girls from a boarding school in Aboke, Uganda. Like the situation in Chibok, the Aboke abductions drew unprecedented international attention to the terrorist situation in the country. Seth G. Jones et al, "The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat," *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (November 2018), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Jones_EvolvingTerroristThreat_FULL_WEB.pdf?F4jhyhPqySTHHFUHSwwfAwq8MspjnJ4q.

Terrorists arrested in Senegal in the summer of 2018 were trained by Boko Haram, and some met and received money from Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. Anna Pujol-Mazzini, "Islamist terrorist groups are turning their attention to West Africa," *The Washington Post* (July 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/07/03/islamist-terrorist-groups-are-turning-their-attention-to-west-africa/?utm_term=.6152d0ba7062. For more information on African insurgencies see: Dalia Ghanem, "Jihadism in the Sahel" Aqim's Strategic Maneuvers for Long-Term Regional Dominance," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (June 23, 2017), https://carnegie-mec.org/2017/06/23/jihadism-in-sahel-aqim-s-strategic-maneuvers-for-long-term-regional-dominance-pub-71413; Danika Newlee, "Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)," *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin; Cooke et al, "Arc of Instability".

[89] One example is in Burkina Faso, where a surge in armed raids in the north has resulted in more than 65,000 not receiving an education. Between January and April of 2018, there were 44 recorded attacks on schools in northern Burkina Faso. United Nations OCHA, "The Sahel crisis deepens".

[90] Save the Children Nigeria, "January 2017 Newsletter," (January 2017), https://nigeria.savethechildren.net/sites/nigeria.savethechildren.net/files/library/Jan%20Newsletter%202017.pdf.

[91] Begging is often the means through which families in camps and host communities live. Financial reliance on all children is essential to survival. Matfess, *Women and Boko Haram,*172.

[92] University of Maryland, "Global Terrorism Database," accessed March 22, 2019, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=30101&target=8&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max.

[93] John Campbell et al, "Boko Haram's Deadly Impact".