

P|I|P|S *Project on International Peace and Security*

The College of William and Mary

POLICY BRIEFS • 2010-2011

The Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS) at the College of William and Mary is a highly selective undergraduate think tank designed to bridge the gap between the academic and policy communities in the area of undergraduate education. The goal of PIPS is to demonstrate that elite students, working with faculty and members of the policy community, can make a meaningful contribution to policy debates. The briefs enclosed are a testament to that mission and the talent, creativity, and rigor of William and Mary's undergraduates.

PIPS would like to thank the Andrew Mellon Foundation, The Weingartner Global Initiative, the Roy R. Charles Center, and the College of Arts and Sciences at the College of William and Mary for their support.

Amy Oakes, Director
Dennis A. Smith, Director

The Project on International Peace and Security
The Institute for Theory and Practice of International Relations
Government Department
The College of William and Mary
P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
757.221.5086
pips@wm.edu

MULTICULTURAL DIPLOMACY: A NEW APPROACH TO EMBASSY OUTREACH

BRIDGET CARR

Since 2001, U.S. public diplomacy to the Arab world has largely focused on expanding access to U.S. friendly news stories and increasing exposure to American youth culture through traditional media. These efforts have largely failed and are viewed by many as propagandistic and culturally insensitive.

This brief proposes an alternative model for public diplomacy that promotes multiculturalism to help Muslim immigrants in Europe integrate into their host societies. Building on current U.S. Embassy efforts in Paris, multicultural public diplomacy would involve cultural and educational initiatives that: (1) highlight and celebrate immigrant culture on its own merits and as it contributes to the host nation; (2) encourage dialogue, mutual respect, and tolerance among communities; and (3) promote the benefits of democratic multiculturalism by emphasizing the successes of minorities and immigrants in the United States. The goal of multicultural diplomacy is to engender positive feelings toward the United States among Muslim immigrants – and, through those immigrants, their relatives in their home countries – by supporting much needed outreach initiatives that aid integration.

Growing Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World

Among Muslims in both the Middle East and Europe, confidence in and positive opinions toward the United States remain low.

The Greater Middle East

- In Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt, only 17% of the population holds a positive opinion of the United States (the Egyptian rating dropped ten percentage points between 2009 and 2010), while 21% of Jordanians and 52% of Lebanese view the United States favorably.¹

Muslim Immigrants in Europe

- In the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes poll, 62% of British Muslims, 60% of German Muslims, and 58% of French Muslims viewed relations between Westerners and Muslims as generally bad.²
- In the 2006 poll, 64% of British Muslims, 48% of German Muslims, and 45% of French Muslims characterized Westerners as arrogant. Among these groups, 67%, 57%, and 51% respectively characterized Westerners as selfish.³

U.S. Public Diplomacy toward the Arab World Since 2001

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has made little effort to culturally engage Arabs in a dialogue or to foster deeper social connections with specific communities. Instead, U.S. public diplomacy has sought to influence public opinion in the Middle East by providing increased access to U.S.-friendly information and exposure to American youth culture. These initiatives have largely faltered and are viewed by many in the region as propagandistic and culturally insensitive.⁴

Major public diplomacy programs since 2001 include:

- *Arabic Radio Station, Radio Sawa*: Provides youth-oriented music and lifestyle programming in addition to news that presents the United States in a positive manner. Broadcast online and in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, and Sudan. Replaced Voice of America Arabic Service in 2002.

Strength: Provides access to American youth culture and helps combat news stories in the Arab media that are unfavorable to the United States.

Weakness: Programming considered to too light for a serious news source and often interpreted as U.S. propaganda. According to former Voices of America Director Robert Reilly, “The more like commercial radio U.S. broadcasting becomes, the less reason it has to exist. After all, the image of America created by the popular media is the cliché that often repels much of the world.”⁵ Ayman Bardawil, a Palestinian broadcaster for al-Quds Educational TV adds that he is “fed up with hearing everything through the American filters” and that he questions whether the “news on Sawa might prevent some people from listening to the music,” effectively highlighting the problems inherent in maintaining a station that attracts young listeners while conveying a pro-American message.⁶

- *Arabic Youth Lifestyle Magazine, Hi*: Designed to showcase American popular culture while simultaneously dispelling negative American stereotypes. Associated with an Arab and English language website launched in 2004.

Strength: Aimed to build inter-cultural bonds by highlighting similarities among global youth.

Weakness: Magazine and website suspended in 2005, pending investigation as to whether content met State Department objectives for public diplomacy. According to surveys in the Middle East, critics of the magazine see it “just like *Sawa*...as ‘soft-sell propaganda,’ the apolitical content of which fails to bridge any gaps with Arabs.” Prominent *Al-Ahram* (a weekly on-line Egyptian newspaper) columnist Salama Ahmed Salama described *Hi* as “too naïve and superficial to bridge any gaps, not even cultural ones” and is “similar to dozens of other Arab magazines presenting trivial material on pop stars for unpoliticized youths.”⁷ The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Karen Hughes, suspended the publication of the magazine to “take a look and see if [the State Department was] actually effective in reaching [its] intended audience with this particular vehicle”⁸ and “because it was unclear how widely it was read.”⁹ The magazine was never re-circulated.

- *Arabic Language TV Station, al-Hurra:* Provides news and American lifestyle programming in the form of sports, cooking, fashion, technology, and entertainment programs.¹⁰ Broadcast throughout the Middle East. Referred to as the “American answer to Al Jazeera.”¹¹

Strength: Delivers world news with a pro-Western point of view.

Weakness: Past broadcasts of culturally insensitive and terrorist-produced material illustrate its poor management and negative reviews. In 2006, *al-Hurra* unintentionally broadcasted several controversial messages including a “68-minute call to arms against Israelis by a senior figure of Hezbollah, deferential coverage of President Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial conference, and a factually flawed piece on a splinter group of Orthodox Jews who oppose the state of Israel” because, according to Broadcasting Board of Governors member Joaquin Blaya, “top officials in the network’s chain of command could not understand what was being said on *al-Hurra* broadcasts.”¹² A 2008 poll conducted by University of Maryland and Zogby International in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates revealed that only two percent of the population in these countries watches *al-Hurra*. A 2009 follow-up indicated a further 0.5 percent decrease in viewership.¹³

- *Middle East Partnership Initiative:* Provides funding for partnerships with non-governmental actors such as NGOs, educational institutions, local governments, and private businesses to strengthen civil society and the rule of law, empower women and youth, improve and expand education, encourage economic development, and increase political participation.¹⁴

Strength: Uses non-traditional and non-governmental resources to expand programming and expertise through interaction with private citizens and operates directly within communities to build lasting and meaningful relationships.¹⁵

Weakness: Both Middle Eastern and U.S. governmental regulations limit the amount of programs and reforms possible because they interfere with the flexibility and effectiveness of aid delivery systems, do not foster regional expertise, and cannot establish critical programs that may be in conflict with other U.S. policies. The State Department is often reluctant to pursue those programs that damage economic and security-based relationships with autocratic regimes and is “largely working within the boundaries set by Arab governments”¹⁶ that do not want to implement initiatives that attack “the thornier questions of political reform.”¹⁷

- *Shared Values Initiative:* Created a series of mini-documentaries designed to dispel mistruths about American treatment of and discrimination against Muslims.

Strength: Provided information about American freedoms and the benefits of tolerant, democratic society through an accessible media.¹⁸

Weakness: Although initially thought to be successful, the project failed, as it was interpreted as abject propaganda by the Muslim world and discontinued less than a month after its release. Although a study conducted by Jami Fullerton and Alice Kendrick registered an increase in positive attitudes held toward the U.S. government and Americans after watching the documentaries, only 5.8 percent of the initial sample and 17 percent of the secondary sample were Muslim and, therefore, the measured impact was fairly irrelevant.¹⁹ “Experts who follow the Arab press say Beers’ ad campaigns [Shared Values Initiative included] are regularly mocked and derided in the Arabic media. ‘The premise of U.S. propaganda in the Middle East is that Muslims and Arabs are idiots – simple-minded, feeble-minded idiots.’”²⁰

Multicultural Public Diplomacy

Multicultural public diplomacy seeks to improve Arab perceptions of the United States by culturally engaging immigrant Muslim populations in Europe. This engagement would involve initiatives that: (1) highlight and celebrate immigrant culture on its own merits and as it contributes to the host nation, (2) encourage dialogue, mutual respect, and tolerance among communities, and (3) promote the benefits of democratic multiculturalism by highlighting the successes of minorities and immigrants in the United States.

The Need: Muslim Communities in Europe

Although officials often refer to all those who phenotypically appear to be foreign-born as “immigrants,” it is important to distinguish between foreign-born Muslims and European-born Muslims to properly assess new and pressing security concerns and trends regarding this segment of the population. Counter-terror strategies have primarily focused on foreign-born Muslims, but evidence shows that European-born Muslims represent both a greater threat and potentially a more receptive target for focused public diplomacy efforts.²¹

- *Foreign-born Muslims (Immigrants)*: This group is often considered the most pressing security threat to the West because its members are associated with a majority of recent terrorist attacks.²² Immigrants migrate to Europe to seek asylum, escape authoritarian regimes, study in Western institutions of higher learning, or, in extreme cases, become part of “ sleeper cells ” responsible for committing terrorist acts. These immigrant extremists – who represent a very small portion of the overall population – usually commit terrorist acts to satisfy a *pre-meditated desire* rather than in response to conditions in the host country. The vast majority of Muslim immigrants that come to Europe peacefully to seek increased economic opportunities (even in the face of discrimination) and are more focused on surviving economically than on organizing political action or joining terrorist organizations.²³
- *European-born Muslims*: Often incorrectly referred to as immigrants, European-born Muslims are raised in a society governed by liberal institutions which promise freedom, equality, and brotherhood for all, but experience disappointment when their host countries fail to adhere to these principles in dealing with “ outsiders. ” This group is very likely to participate in communitarian activism and is susceptible to radicalization.²⁴ European-born Muslims represent a significant threat to U.S. security because potential terrorists born in the European Union not only have free movement throughout Europe, but also to the United States without a visa or entry interview.²⁵ Perhaps foreshadowing a future trend, all organizers of the various major terrorist attacks on Europe were born in the Middle East except those who carried out the most recent bombings in London in 2005.²⁶

The Paris Embassy Success

Recent U.S. public diplomatic efforts in Paris have consisted of relatively simple yet pointed efforts to increase the visibility of minority communities accustomed to being forgotten or oppressed as a result of French laws that forbid preferential treatment for a specific group. These laws, in practice, help perpetuate the existence of shantytowns, suppress religious expression, and segregate rather than integrate.²⁷ According to *banlieue* resident Aziz Senni (founder of a taxi service and an investment fund designed to encourage economic development in these suburbs), giving recognition to the *banlieues* is “ worth more as much as gold, ”²⁸ while Rokhaya Diallo, leader of “ Les Indivisibles ” (a group which

promotes racial harmony) observes, “a foreign country identifies us as potential leaders. Here we receive no recognition [by the French government].”²⁹

Successful U.S. Embassy in Paris programming to this marginalized community includes the following:

- *Create Today*: A cultural entrepreneurship initiative that highlights ways to pursue a career in the arts both through private and public channels. The program is designed reinforce the concept of “shared values” between the United States and France to “defend artistic creativity” in any form.³⁰

Impact: According to a United States embassy official, the program was extremely well-received by members of these communities (many of them Muslims) who want to increase global understanding of their culture through art.³¹

- *Mural Arts Program*: A partnership between a Philadelphia-based arts group and local community leaders in Villiers-le-Bel, Bondy, and Bagnolet to create murals commemorating the message of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.³²

Impact: Increases the visibility of a community, reinforces peaceful and moderate values within disaffected populations. The mayor of Bondy, M. Roger, notes that residents of the *banlieues* “have the sense that the United States looks upon our areas with much more deference and respect [than the French government].”³³

- *Unconventional “Speakers Programs”*: Personal connections with the ambassador brought Samuel L. Jackson to Bondy where he spoke with youth about growing up in Tennessee during segregation, the importance of education, and capitalizing on opportunities.

Impact: Emphasizes the possibilities associated with the “American Dream” (even for a marginalized minority group), a philosophy that can easily be extended throughout the world.³⁴ According to one of the students in attendance, Widad Ketfi, “American attention is proof that ‘these young people are succeeding’ and that ‘we’re not invisible.’” Claude Grunitzky, founder of Trace TV (an urban culture network) and author of *Transculturalismes (Transculturalisms)*, notes that “The United States is truly invested in the problem of the *banlieues* and those of the urban youth who reside there. [The United States’ government] knows that the ‘American Dream’ is very present in the collective conscious and wants to support that [in these areas].”³⁵

Building On Success

In light of French embassy success in underserved neighborhoods composed of largely Muslim populations, the Department of State should expand similar programs throughout Europe and sharpen the focus of these initiatives on Muslim communities. As noted by the

mayor of Vénissieux (a *banlieue* south of the industrial city of Lyon), André Gérin, “These [new diplomatic] practices are logical to the United States. France under-estimates the terrorist threats, in contrast to Americans who magnify them. Their involvement in the *banlieues* follows.”³⁶ The major objectives of these programs should be:

- 1) To highlight and celebrate immigrant culture on its own merits and as it contributes to the host nation.

Proposed Programs: Arts-exchange programs, micro-grants for entrepreneurial cultural expositions, and religious festivals to increase awareness and understanding of moderate Islam.

Desired Outcome: De-politicize discussion of Arab-Muslim culture in order to better understand how this community can retain its cultural integrity while being effectively integrated into the existing Western framework.

- 2) To encourage dialogue, mutual respect, and tolerance among communities.

Proposed Programs: Alternative interaction with local law enforcement (such as police-taught self-defense classes)³⁷, educational seminars for community leaders on topics ranging from political participation to effective media application, and townhall-style meetings with politically neutral moderators.

Desired Outcome: Cultivate and encourage moderate and peaceful leadership within the Muslim communities that work productively within the system instead of violently against it. Connect law enforcement and local government officials with historically marginalized communities in order to “humanize” each group’s objectives and establish a network of trust between opposing groups regardless of past injustices or abuse.

- 3) To promote the benefits of democratic multiculturalism by highlighting the successes of minorities and immigrants in the United States.

Proposed Programs: Non-academic speakers series conducted by celebrities, entrepreneurs, non-profit organizers, etc., distribution of multi-media educational materials created for minority groups by minority groups, and personal address by President Barack Obama in a *banlieue* such as Bondy.³⁸

Desired Outcome: Demonstrate that liberal ideology and democratic institutions can help minorities achieve economic progress and social acceptance without a loss of identity.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Multicultural Diplomacy

Strength

- Focuses on reaching out to populations in democratic countries at risk of radicalization.
- Emphasizes the ways that Muslims can enrich their host country through projects that increase their visibility and showcase their talents. In doing so, these programs demonstrate the United States' respect of immigrant culture and Islam.
- Creates and expands a network of "moderate Muslims" that serve as role models for feasibility of integration of Muslim tradition and republican values in the greater Middle East.

Weakness

- Potentially perceived as outside the traditional constraints of diplomatic efforts and, therefore, inappropriate.³⁹

Response: Although these new multicultural diplomacy programs often address social problems that should ideally be managed by the host nation government, the goal is to positively impact and reinforce pro-Western attitudes and values within marginalized Muslim populations regardless of which nation effectively accomplishes it. Rhetoric and access to media are not sufficient to change attitudes among disenfranchised population. The United States must champion the benefits of democratic multiculturalism by providing programming that educates and helps immigrants integrate into their host societies.

- Susceptible to criticism from host nation populations who fear infiltration or unwanted influence from the United States within their immigration policy.⁴⁰

Response: All of the efforts proposed should be conducted with the consent of or in partnership with the host government.⁴¹ Much of the criticism for programs conducted in Paris have come from nationalist, reactionary groups who resent *any* kind of outside influence, whether from an allied nation or immigrant communities in general. Their exaggerated response is not credible in the eyes of the majority of the French people.

¹ Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Obama More Popular Abroad Than At Home, Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benefit,” *Pew Research Center*, June 17, 2010, <http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/>.

² Pew Global Attitudes Project, “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other,” *Pew Research Center*, June 22, 2006, <http://pewglobal.org/2006/06/22/the-great-divide-how-westerners-and-muslims-view-each-other/>.

³ Pew Global Attitudes Project, “The Great Divide.”

⁴ United States’ government-run mass media programs designed to communicate a specific message operated in a region already “saturated” with information. This represents a failure to tailor public diplomacy strategy popular during the Cold War era to the changing nature of global conflict. The “War of Ideas” is no longer a bipolar conflict; therefore, creating networks of positive U.S. influence is of paramount concern in reaching target audiences. Some of the most pressing problems emerge from this outdated methodology because efforts focus on control of communication channels rather than effective navigation of them. Therefore, the United States lacks credibility in its dissemination of messages in the media and critics can easily distort and filter “universal messages” offered. R. S. Zaharna, “The Network Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy,” *Foreign Policy in Focus* 10, no. 1 (2005): 1–2.

⁵ Ilan Berman, “Messaging to the (Muslim) Masses,” *The Journal of International Security Affairs* Fall 2009, no. 17.

⁶ George Gedda, “Radio Sawa: Music as a Tool,” *Foreign Service Journal* 79, no. 12 (November 2002): 53-56.

⁷ Gihan Shahine, “Hi is not enough,” *Al-Ahram*, November 18, 2003, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/656/eg8.htm>.

⁸ Sean McCormack, “State Department Briefing, December 22,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, December 22, 2005, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/12/mil-051222-usia02.htm>.

⁹ Saul Hudson, “US halts Arabic magazine meant to boost US image,” *Reuters*, December 22, 2005.

¹⁰ Jeremy M. Sharp, *The Middle East Television Network: An Overview*, CRS Report for Congress (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, August 17, 2005).

¹¹ Matthew Craft, “US Arabic channel a turn-off,” *guardian.co.uk*, February 16, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/feb/16/broadcasting.usnews>.

¹² Brian Ross, “U.S. Government Gave Airtime to Terrorists, Official Admits,” *The Blotter*, May 22, 2007, http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/05/us_government_g.html.

¹³ Dafna Linzer, “Alhurra Bleeding Viewers, Poll Finds, But Spending is Up,” *ProPublica*, May 29, 2009, <http://www.propublica.org/article/alhurra-bleeding-viewers-poll-finds-but-spending-is-up-529>.

¹⁴ Jeremy M. Sharp, *The Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview*, CRS Report for Congress (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, July 20, 2005).

¹⁵ Zaharna, “The Network Paradigm.”

¹⁶ Thomas Carothers, *A Better Way to Support Middle East Reform* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2005).

¹⁷ Tamara Cofman Wittes and Sarah E. Yerkes, “The Middle East Partnership Initiative: Progress, Problems, and Prospects,” *Brookings*, November 29, 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/1129middleeast_wittes.aspx.

¹⁸ Sheldon Rampton, “Shared Values Revisited,” *The Center for Media and Democracy's PR Watch*, December 17, 2007, <http://www.prwatch.org/node/6465>.

¹⁹ Jami A. Fullerton and Alice Kendrick, *Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the U.S. State Department's Shared Values Initiative* (Marquette Books, 2006).

²⁰ Michelle Goldberg, “To know America is to love America?,” *Salon.com*, December 19, 2002, <http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/12/19/beers/index.html>.

²¹ “A Nixon Center study of 373 *mujahideen* in western Europe and North America between 1993 and 2004 found more than twice as many Frenchmen as Saudis and more Britons than Sudanese, Yemenites, Emiratis, Lebanese, or Libyans. Fully a quarter of the jihadists it listed were western European nationals – eligible to travel visa-free to the United States.” Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 4 (July 2005): 120-135.

²² Six first-generation immigrants from Morocco (Jamal Zougam, Othman el-Gnaoui, Youssef Belhadj, Hassan el Haski, Abdulmajid Bouchar and Rafa Zouhier) carried out the 2005 Madrid bombings, and suicide bombers from the Salafia Jihadia congregation, an offshoot of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, executed the 2003 and 2007 Casablanca bombings. “Madrid bombing suspects,” *BBC NEWS*, March 10, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3560603.stm>. “Terrorist Organization Profile: Salafia Jihadia,” *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism*, 2011, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4257.

²³ Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims.”

²⁴ Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims.”

²⁵ In an interview originally published in *Le Parisien*, Justin Vaïsse discussed American Embassy initiatives in Paris and noted specifically that the Americans started to concern themselves with the *banlieues* after September 11, 2001 because of security concerns: any French citizen can enter the United States without a visa which leaves the United States vulnerable to French radicals. Original quote: “L’intérêt commence vraiment le 11 Septembre. Pour des questions sécuritaires d’abord. Tout citoyen français peut alors se rendre aux Etats-Unis sans visa. Cette absence de contrôle les rend vulnérables face à des éléments radicalisés détenteurs de passeports français.” Justin Vaïsse, “Les Américains cherchent à se créer un réseau,” *Brookings*, April 21, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2008/0421_france_vaïsse.aspx.

²⁶ Most recent major terrorist attacks include the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the Madrid bombing of 2004, and the London bombing of 2005.

²⁷ Shantytowns or *bidonvilles* (although formerly believed to have been effectively eradicated by aggressive implementation of social programs in the 1960s and 1970s) still exist on the outskirts of major cities such as Lyon. Elisa Frisullo, “La multiplication des bidonvilles inquiète,” *20 minutes*, June 23, 2006, <http://www.20minutes.fr/article/93801/Lyon-La-multiplication-des-bidonvilles-inquiete.php>

²⁸ Scott Sayare, “Feeling Slighted by France, and Respected by U.S.,” *The New York Times*, September 22, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/world/europe/23france.html>.

²⁹ John Lichfield, “Stallone joins US invasion of French ghettos,” *The Independent*, August 4, 2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/stallone-joins-us-invasion-of-french-ghettos-2042511.html>.

³⁰ “Create Today - French and American perspectives on Young Cultural Entrepreneurs,” *Embassy of the United States Paris, France*, June 24, 2010, <http://france.usembassy.gov/event100624b.html>.

³¹ U.S. Embassy official in Paris, February 4, 2011.

³² One can draw a pointed comparison between the plight of African Americans in the 1960s and that of Muslim immigrants and their families in France. However, French Muslims do not have a uniting, pacifistic figure like Martin Luther King, Jr. to lead them. By encouraging the youthful generation in *banlieues* to effectively participate within the constraints of the current democratic system, it is possible that the United States Embassy could help mentor the next great moderate Muslim leader in France or in all of Europe. Steven Philip Kramer, “The End of French Europe?,” in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85 (Foreign Affairs, 2006), 126-138.

³³ Sayare, “Feeling Slighted.”

³⁴ Sayare, “Feeling Slighted.”

³⁵ Original quote: “Les Etats-Unis sont vraiment investis dans le problème des banlieues et celui des jeunes urbaines qui y résident. Ils savent que le rêve américain est bien présent dans les consciences collectives et veulent l’entretenir.” From “Banlieues: OPA américaine sur les beurs et les blacks Pauline Delassus » 22 April 2008 *Marianne 2*

³⁶ Original quote: “De telles pratiques sont logiques aux Etats-Unis. La France sous-estime la menace terroriste, à l’inverse des Américains qui l’amplifient. Leur implication dans les banlieues en découle.” Pauline Delassus, “Banlieues: OPA américaine sur les beurs et les blacks,” *Marianne 2*, April 22, 2008, http://www.marianne2.fr/Banlieues-OPA-americaine-sur-les-beurs-et-les-blacks_a86469.html.

³⁷ As implemented by the Brazilian law enforcement in the infamous slums of Rio de Janeiro. “Years of hate and mistrust are thawing in some of Rio’s most violent slums...Rio officials have embarked on an ambitious plan to wrest control of the slums from ruthless drug gangs...The peace officers are central to that effort, flooding in after the military police clear the streets in gun battles...Their job is part tradition policing, part social work. They devote themselves to winning over residents scarred by decades of violence – some at the hands of the police.” Alexei Barrionuevo, “In Rough Slum, Brazil’s Police Try Soft Touch,” *The New York Times*, October 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/world/americas/11brazil.html?_r=2.

³⁸ Authors for the French news website *Rue89* François Durpaire and Jean Claude Tchicaya interviewed French high school students from the *banlieues* about their views on the possibility of the election of Barack Obama to the President of the United States. One student exclaimed that Obama’s victory would be the “liberation of all the world’s blacks. [His election] would mean that everything is possible.” (Original quote: “La victoire d’Obama serait ‘la libération de tous les Noirs du monde. Cela voudrait dire que tout est possible!’”) The authors also note that an American diplomat believes that any public diplomacy efforts conducted in Paris could not come close to the positive impact that Obama’s election would have on America’s image in the *banlieues* (which is currently “marked by strong feelings of anti-Americanism.”) The embassy official believed that with Obama in office “three-quarters of our work would already be done.” (Original quote: “L’objectif est de modifier progressivement l’opinion des banlieues marquée par un fort antiaméricanisme. Mais de l’avis d’un diplomate américain, cette politique ne serait rien par rapport au gain d’image qu’apporterait l’élection du sénateur de l’Illinois: Obama président, les trois quarts

de notre travail seraient faits!” François Durpaire and Jean Claude Tchicaya, “Grâce à Obama, les Etats-Unis mieux perçus dans les banlieues,” *Rue89*, May 6, 2008, <http://www.rue89.com/campagnes-damerique/grace-a-obama-les-etats-unis-mieux-percus-dans-les-banlieues>.

³⁹ Emeline Cazi, “Pourquoi les Etats-Unis s'intéressent à nos banlieues,” *Le Parisien*, April 21, 2008, <http://www.leparisien.fr/une/pourquoi-les-etats-unis-s-interessent-a-nos-banlieues-21-04-2008-3298451396.php>.

⁴⁰ André Gérin (Vénissieux mayor) comments on the United States' involvement in the *banlieues*: “I was surprised to learn [about these programs] in a newspaper article and I will be curious to know the position of the French government and the President of the Republic on these programs. A problem results from the point of view of the authority of our institutions and the independence of France vis-à-vis the United States.” Original quote “J’ai été étonné d’apprendre ça à la une d’un journal et je serais curieux de connaître la posture du gouvernement français et du président de la République sur ces actions. Un problème se pose d’un point de vue de l’autorité de nos institutions et de l’indépendance de la France vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis.” Delassus, “Banlieues.”

⁴¹ U.S. Embassy official in Paris, February 4, 2011.